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Abstract
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting
firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly,
a research university wishes to hire strong job market candidates while also placing its own candidates at strong
peer universities. We model this affiliate matching problem in a generalization of the classic stable marriage setting
by permitting firms to state preferences over not just which workers to whom they are matched, but also to which
firms their affiliated workers are matched. Based on results from a human survey, we find that participants (acting as
firms) give preference to their own affiliate workers in surprising ways that violate some assumptions of the classical
stable marriage problem. This motivates a nuanced discussion of how stability could be defined in affiliate matching
problems; we give an example of a marketplace which admits a stable match under one natural definition of stability,
and does not for that same marketplace under a different, but still natural, definition. We conclude by setting a research
agenda toward the creation of a centralized clearing mechanism in this general setting.
My loyalty for my student made me choose the best place for him.
Survey Respondent #103
Strange here because I opted to go with my third choice Ryan over getting my second
choice ... an emotional reaction because he is a graduate of my school.
Survey Respondent #6
I would not play favorites with my student. It would not be fair.
Survey Respondent #136
1 Introduction
Markets are systems that empower interested parties—humans, firms, governments, or autonomous agents—to ex-
change goods, services, and information. In some markets, such as stock and commodity exchanges, prices do all of
the “work” of matching supply and demand. Yet, due to logistical or societal constraints [Roth, 2007], many mar-
kets cannot rely solely on prices to match supply and demand. Examples include school choice [Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez, 2003], medical residency [Roth and Peranson, 1999], online dating [Bragdon et al., 2010], advertising [Edel-
man et al., 2007], deceased-donor organ allocation [Bertsimas et al., 2013], online labor [Arnosti et al., 2014], housing
allocation [Bloch and Cantala, 2013], job search [Das and Tsitsiklis, 2010], refugee placement [Delacre´taz et al.,
2019], and barter markets such as kidney exchange [Dickerson and Sandholm, 2015, Manlove and O’Malley, 2015].
∗This is working paper of early-stage research. We realize the matching literature is expansive and multi-disciplinary, and we welcome connec-
tions between published research and our model. Corresponding author: sdooley1@cs.umd.edu
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We focus on two-sided matching problems where agents on one side of a market are allocated to agents on the
other based solely on ranked preferences over potential matching outcomes. Traditionally, agents express a preference
ordering over other agents, e.g., as in the classical stable marriage problem due to Gale and Shapley [1962]. Yet, agents
may implicitly have preferences over their own match outcome, but also over the match outcome of others—though
they are seldom able to express that latter class of preference explicitly. As an explicit example, in an academic hiring
market, universities both place candidates into the job market (via graduation) and take candidates out of the job
market (via hiring). Universities care not only about the quality of candidate that they hire, but also about the match
outcome(s) of their graduating candidates. Thus, expression of such preferences by a firm (ne´ employer) necessarily
extends beyond a simple rank ordering of workers (ne´ candidates) on the opposing side.
Our contributions. In this paper, we study how a class of explicit complex preferences over match outcomes impacts
a matching market. Specifically, we:
• Initiate the study of the affiliate matching problem within a generalization of the classical stable marriage setting;
• Provide experimental evidence that humans (acting as firms) on one side of a market do “act differently” with re-
spect to stable marriage when expressing preferences over match outcomes when worker affiliations are present;
• Draw on joint intuition from the matching literature as well as our human experiment to define appropriate
notions of a standard desideratum in matching settings, stability, and show that different natural definitions of
stability result in the differing existence of stable matchings; and
• Discuss four concrete research challenges for future scholarship in this novel matching setting.
Placement in the literature. The stable marriage problem, as presented by Gale and Shapley [1962], operates a
centralized matching scheme where agents on one side of a market have strict ordinal preferences over (subsets) of
agents on the other side. Here, stability is a central desideratum to be achieved in a final match outcome (see work due
to Roth [1982] for additional motivation); we continue that focus in this paper, albeit (necessarily) by defining new
notions of stability to fit our general model.
Many variants of stable matching problems have been explored, including: additional constraints such as capac-
ity [Gusfield and Irving, 1989], where agents on one side of the market may be matched to more than one but at
most some limit (with application found in the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) [Roth and Peranson,
1999]); preference orderings that are incomplete [Gusfield and Irving, 1989] or are not strict [Gusfield and Irving,
1989, Irving, 1994]; non-bipartite markets as in the case of the stable roommates problem for additional coverage; and
many others. We direct the reader to a recent comprehensive overview due to Manlove [2013]. In our work, we extend
the preference language beyond that found in these and other traditional settings (described in greater detail next in
Section 2).
The AI community has played a central role in understanding the computational complexity impacts of various
constraints and generalizations in matching problems [Iwama et al., 1999, Manlove et al., 2002, Liu et al., 2014,
Perrault et al., 2016, Delorme et al., 2019]. While basic forms of matching are often solvable in polynomial time
(see, for example, the seminal work due to Gale and Shapley [1962] as well as Irving [1985] for two well-known
examples), generalized versions often required the use of sophisticated optimization approaches such as constraint
programming [Prosser, 2014, Manlove et al., 2017], SAT [Drummond et al., 2015, Endriss, 2020], answer set pro-
gramming [Erdem et al., 2020], integer programming [Delorme et al., 2019]; we direct the reader to a recent survey
due to Geist and Peters [2017] for an in-depth review of computational approaches to clearing stable matching prob-
lems. In Section 4, we follow this trend and provide a general integer-programming-based approach to finding stable
matchings (or proving one does not exist) in our context.
2 Model of Affiliate Matching
We now set up the notation, intuition, and initial observations of modeling the affiliate matching problem.
We are motivated by scenarios where the two sides of the market are interconnected via affiliations, like faculty
hiring markets, certain consulting labor markets, etc. We want to study how these affiliations influence the dynamics
of this matching market; so we first define the problem.
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a1
a2
a3
e1 ≺ e2 ≺ e3
e2 ≺ e3 ≺ e1
e2 ≺ e1 ≺ e3
e1
e2
e3
(a2, e3)  (a1, e1)  (a3, e2)  (a2, e2)  (a3, e3)
(a1, e3)  (a3, e3)  (a1, e1)  (a3, e1)  (a2, e2)
(a1, e1)  (a2, e1)  (a3, e3)  (a2, e2)  (a1, e2)
µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6
Figure 1: Above, a completely expressed example marketplace between employers, each with one affiliate. Affiliations
are denoted with a gray connection between ai and ei for i = 1, 2, 3. Below, the 6 possible matchings are enumerated.
Affiliate Matching
We introduce a new matching model, which we call affiliate matching, which assumes there are two, disjoint sides of
a market where each side has affiliations with the other. In the case of the faculty matching market, an applicant and a
university have an affiliation if the applicant attended that university for their graduate studies. In some labor markets
like management consulting, an applicant and employer have an affiliation if the applicant was previously employed
by that employer. Formally, let A = {ai}ni=1 be a set of applicants and E = {ej}mj=1 be a set of employers. For each
employer, e, let us denote the set of applicants affiliated with e with the ordered set Re. Denote the cardinality of Re
as re.
We define matches as in the standard bipartite matching problem. A match µ is a function µ : A
⊔
E → A⊔E
such that for each element a ∈ A, we have µ(a) ∈ E, and for each element e ∈ E, we have µ(e) ∈ A. Further, we
note that µ(a) = e if and only if µ(e) = a.
Based on the motivating scenarios, it makes sense to have the preference languages for each side of the market
vary slightly. The applicants will have their standard preference language, as in stable marriage. We denote ≺a to
be the preference of applicant a where α ≺a β means that outcome β is preferred to outcome α by candidate a. The
employers however will have a modified preference language that indicates where they would like to see their affiliates
be matched. Each employer has preference orderings ≺e over the tuples of A× Ere . For employer e, we interpret an
outcome (a, γ1, . . . , γre) ∈ A × Ere to mean that the employer e is matched with applicant a and would like the
k-th member of Re to be matched with employer γk. We note that ≺e will not be a complete and total ordering over
A × Ere as there may be inconsistencies present in a tuple. For example, one cannot prefer to be matched with their
own affiliate and have their affiliate be matched elsewhere. For this paper, let us assume that preferences are expressed
as strict, for ease of introduction.
Example 1. Let us look at an example in Figure 1. In this example, we have three agents on each side of the market:
three applicants a1, a2, a3, and three employers e1, e2, e3. Each employer only has one affiliate, re = 1 for all e, and
ai is the affiliate of ei for all i (denoted with the gray connections between the two sides). Each agent’s preferences
are expressed in the preference language defined above.
We observe something unique about this model that has particular salience for affiliate matching: we can relate the
preference profiles of the agents to the structure of the possible matchings. This is true in the stable marriage problem,
but has little utility—an agent’s preference language only permits expression of a preference over their own match. In
this case, like for a1, a2, a3, we can relate their profile to the six possible matchings µi for i = 1, . . . 6. For instance,
there is a one-to-one relationship between a1’s preference profile e1 ≺ e2 ≺ e3 and µ1, µ2 ≺ µ3, µ4 ≺ µ5, µ6.
We can do a similar thing for e1 and rewrite their preference profile as µ5  µ1, µ2  µ4  µ3  µ6. Rewriting
the preferences like this demonstrates the connection between a preference profile for an employer and the overall
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structure of its preferred matches. We observe that the employer preference language enables expression over portions
of the final matching structure. s
Connection to Other Preference Profiles
When considering the affiliate matching problem, it appears to be a superficial change in the preference language
for the employers—matches are still bipartite and employees still have their same preference language. However,
this slight change brings about the question: How do employers combine their thoughts about applicants with their
thoughts about their fellow employers? It is natural to assume that each employer has some internal preference over
which applicant they would like to hire. Also, they may have an ordering of the fit of the other employers for their
affiliates. They may use this to articulate their preference that their affiliates be matched at higher ranking employers.
It is not immediately determined how to convert two preference profiles over applicants and other employers into the
preference language of tuples over A× Ere .
To formalize, consider an employer e. The employer may have preferences over the applicants to which they are
matched, ≺e, and also preferences over their fellow employers, ≺ˆe. They ultimately must derive a strategy α which
takes these two profiles and outputs ≺e, i.e., α(≺ˆe,≺e) =≺e. In the case of re = 1, there are ((m− 1)(n− 1) + 1)!
possible choices for the strategy α. Of course, a good number of them wouldn’t be rational, as we can see in this
example.
Example 2. Consider a marketplace with three applicants (Ryan, Alex, and Taylor), and three employers (the Bear
Mountain University (BMU), Littlewood University (LU), and West Shores University (WSU)). Assume that BMU has
this preference over applicants:
Alex  Ryan  Taylor;
and BMU had this preference over employers:
LU ˆ BMU ˆ WSU.
Further assume that RBMU = {Ryan}. Here are some possible combination strategies α:
1. (A, LU)  (A, WSU)  (R, BMU)  (T, LU)  (T, WSU)
2. (A, LU)  (T, LU)  (R, BMU)  (A, WSU)  (T, WSU)
3. (T, WSU)  (T, LU)  (A, WSU)  (A, LU)  (R, BMU)
4. (A, LU)  (R, BMU)  (A, WSU)  (T, LU)  (T, WSU)
5. . . .
The first two examples could be considered rational on the part of the employer e. We can interpret (1) as an employer
who prefers being matched to their preferred applicant more than ensuring a good placement for their affiliate. The
second strategy (2) does just the opposite—prioritizing the placement of their affiliate. It is difficult to label the third
strategy (3) as rational, and finally the fourth strategy (4) is somewhere between (1) and (2).
Consistent Employer Profiles
The first combination strategy in Example 2 is worth further discussion. We observe that this strategy corresponds with
a rational agent who has no regard for the matching of their affiliate. In the most extreme sense, this affiliate-agnostic
agent in the Example 2 setting might randomly choose1 from the set of four orderings
(A, ?)  (A, ?)  (R, BMU)  (T, ?)  (T, ?)
where ‘?’ is randomly chosen in {LU,WSU}.
One property of this affiliate-agnostic agent’s preference profile is that the first element in every tuple of  pre-
serves the order of their  profile. Therefore, we have the following definition.
1With a relaxation of strict orderings, this could be expressed via ties/indifference.
4
Definition 1. An employer’s preference profile is said to be consistent (with respect to) if the ordering of the first
element of each tuple of  preserves the ordering of . An employer is said to be affiliate-agnostic if their preference
profile are consistent.
If all agents were affiliate-agnostic with consistent preferences, then it might be fair to conclude that the affiliate
matching model is not interesting and just reduces back to the stable marriage problem. However, it is reasonable to
believe that not all employers, and in fact most employers with affiliates, would not have consistent preference profiles
most of the time. If employers do not admit affiliate-agnostic preferences, then we should conclude that the affiliate
matching problem is novel and worth modeling in a new way. In the next section, we devise a crowdsourced survey to
study if employers are actually affiliate-agnostic.
3 Experimental Evidence in Support of the Affiliate Matching Model
We hypothesize that: (1) there is such variation in how employers combine their preferences over both sides of the
market to maximize their utility, and (2) the affiliation induces the employer to prefer for their affiliates to be matched
to more preferred employers. We study these two claims through the use of a crowdsourced survey.
Survey Design
We created a survey about a faculty hiring program, and we administered using the crowdsource platform Cint. We pre-
sented the participants with a series of questions like in Example 2: Assume you are BMU in a market with three agents
on either side, and your affiliate is Ryan. If you assume your preferences over schools are ≺ˆ and your preferences over
applicants are ≺, what is your preference profile ≺?
The structure of the survey was designed as follows. There was a short introduction section which presented the
faculty hiring problem and primed the participant to consider themselves to be one of the universities. Then, there was a
topic-related test which asked the participant to match the text based description of a match to the visual representation
thereof. This was used to screen out participants who were just clicking-through the survey. Next, the concept of
affiliates was introduced and the five possible matchings were enumerated, as in Figure 1 where µ1 and µ2 have the
same outcome if you’re BMU. We then randomly assigned participants to be primed to believe that prioritizing their
affiliate’s matching would ultimately lead to a better outcome for their university in the future. Part of this priming
language was: So, keep in mind that if Ryan is placed at a higher ranked university, then your university will be viewed
better and could hire better candidates in the future.
Finally, the participants were asked to rank the five possible matchings based on randomly assigned ˆ and , as
in Example 2. We only aimed to test how the employer, BMU, would behave based on where it was placed in ˆ, and
also based on where its student, Ryan, was placed in . Therefore, there are a total of 9 different scenarios. The first
scenario places Ryan as the top choice in  and BMU as the top choice in ˆ. (The order of the remaining agents
was randomized.) The second scenario keeps BMU as the top choice, but makes Ryan the second choice. The third
scenario again keeps BMU as the top choice, and makes Ryan the third choice. The fourth through sixth scenarios
maintain the same pattern with BMU as the second choice. Similarly, the seventh through ninth scenarios have BMU
as the third choice. In the survey, the participants were shown seven of these nine scenarios in a random order. The
participants were also given the opportunity to explain why they chose that particular ordering.
In designing the survey in this way, we had two main research questions:
1. How common or infrequent are the different possible prioritization strategies α(≺ˆe,≺e) =≺e?
2. Do participants care about the placement of their affiliate?
The survey design was IRB reviewed and subsequently determined to be exempt from IRB oversight because
the data were crowdsourced and we did not collect any personally identifiable information or demographics of the
participants. The entirety of the survey protocol is listed in the Appendix.
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Scenario
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Top 1 80% 49% 40% 47% 50% 42% 38% 42% 38%
Top 2 48% 26% 24% 27% 25% 18% 20% 22% 18%
Top 3 19% 20% 13% 23% 18% 12% 11% 10% 11%
Top 4 18% 15% 12% 14% 13% 10% 9% 9% 9%
Top 5 18% 15% 12% 14% 13% 10% 9% 9% 9%
Table 1: Percentage agreement for most common Top k elements of the of the preference profile across the nine
scenarios. The ‘Top 1’ condition reports the percentage of respondents who agreed with the most common outcome
which they most prefer. The ‘Top 2’ condition reports the percentage of respondents who agreed with the most common
outcome for the most and second most preferred. ‘Top 5’ reports the percentage of respondents who agreed on the most
common full preference profile .
Scenario
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Consistency
Frequency 26% 7% 4% 14% 4% 4% 9% 2% 1%
Table 2: Percentage of full preference profiles which were consistent for each scenario.
Survey Results
We used the Cint crowdsourcing platform to recruit participants. The only requirement for participation was to be
English-speaking and be located in the United States. We did also filter out participants who did not pass our click
through, comprehension test. The final data included 200 participants which we further filtered down to 154 partic-
ipants after analyzing the participants responses for any further click-throughs or participants who self-identified as
not-understanding the survey. The median time to take the survey of these participants was 19.8 minutes. We paid Cint
$3.05 for each of the 200 responses.
For our first research question, we ask whether the respondents were responding randomly to the different sce-
narios. We observe qualitatively that there is relatively strong agreement on the entire preference profiles, though that
diminishes as BMU becomes less desirable. For instance, if BMU and Ryan are both in the top tier, 18% of respon-
dents agreed on the full preference profile. This diminished to just 9% when BMU and Ryan were the lowest ranked.
However, agreement on the entire preference profile is a strict condition.
We found anecdotally that participants’ strategies for the survey response were to identify the top two or three
outcomes they preferred and had less careful consideration for the 4th and 5th outcomes. Therefore, we also report
agreement on the preference orderings for the first one, two, and three outcomes. Results are reported in Table 1.
When we ask how common are the most preferred top three elements of the preference profile, we observe that
that when BMU and Ryan are both top tier, agreement increases slightly from 18% to 19%. It increases to 48% when
considering agreement on the ordering of the top two, and finally achieves 80% agreement for the most common top
choice in this scenario.
We observe similar qualitative behavior for the other scenarios; when BMU and Ryan are in the bottom tier, the
most common top choice is only chosen by 38% of respondents.
We conclude from these results that there is structure in the survey responses, with some particular strategies, α,
being more common than others, and there not being one governing strategy for any of the scenarios which most
respondents can agree is proper.
For our second research question, we ask the question: how common is it for the respondents to choose a prefer-
ence profile which is consistent? Recall that for any given  and ˆ, there are only four preference profiles that are
considered consistent. We report the percentage of responses which are consistent for each of the nine scenarios in
Table 2. Here we see that the first and fourth scenarios have higher percentages of consistent responses than the others.
6
One might also say that the seventh scenario also has a higher percentage, compared to its related scenarios eight
and nine. The first, fourth, and seventh scenarios all correspond to the case where Ryan is the top tier student. This
indicates that consistency is generally more common in these scenarios when controlling for the location of BMU.
Thus, when an employer’s student is ranked lower, there is a higher likelihood of having an inconsistent preference
profile.
We also analyze how frequently individual respondents reported a consistent profile. We see that a total of 58 out
of 154 respondents reported a consistent preference at least once, 17 did so twice, seven did so three times, and no one
did more than three. Interestingly, four of the seven who reported three consistent profiles did so on the 1st, fourth, and
seventh scenarios. This indicates there actually is some structure about Ryan being the top student and the consistency
of the profile.
Recall that part of the survey design included a priming for respondents to consider the quality of match of their
student as equally as important as their own match. We also found that the priming had no impact on the frequency of
consistent responses.
These results indicate two things: (1) consistency is dependent on the given scenario as dictated by  and ˆ, and
(2) consistency is relatively infrequent in the majority of the cases.
Limitations
We briefly discuss the limitations of this experiment. Primarily, this was a survey experiment with non-experts in
graduate hiring. Therefore, there might be some desirability effects in the response data, and the noise is likely higher
than it would have been if we had used domain experts. It is challenging to find experts in this field who may better
understand how competing priorities are dealt with when consider the match of a university and the match of that
university’s affiliates. It would be very interesting to conduct a similar survey with that population.
Further, the data quantity is limited. The survey would be enhanced with more responses to test perform a Chi-
squared test about the randomness of the responses. However, we have strong evidence that there is structure in these
responses and respondents were (generally) not just clicking through.
Finally, we tried to test about how priming the respondent might impact their response. We did not find any
significant difference in the two group’s consistency, which could either be a poor priming model or that there is no
effect in this crowdsourced survey design.
4 What is Stability in Affiliate Matching?
With any new model for a market, it is important to get the definition of stability correct. In normal stable marriage, a
matching is stable if there does not exist a blocking pair (a, e) which would each prefer each other over their current
match. In affiliate matching, it is clear when an applicant might want to deviate from their match, as their preference
language in this model is the same as in the stable marriage problem. An applicant a would only want to leave a
marketplace with match µ if they could find a consenting individual e such that µ(a) ≺a e.
In the affiliate matching problem, the employer’s preference language includes preferences over their affiliate’s
match. This detail provides a level of nuance which we will discuss in this section.
Let us take the example in Figure 1. Consider match µ1 and employer e1. For this employer, the current match is
its second most preferred outcome. However, employer e1 would prefer to be matched with applicant a2 as long as
applicant a1 is matched with employer e3. Further, applicant a2’s most preferred match is with employer e1. However,
if a2 and e1 left the marketplace to be matched together, e1 cannot guarantee that a1 will be matched with e3, which
would result in its most preferred outcome. If, on the other hand, as a consequence of a2 and e1 leaving the marketplace,
it happened that a1 was matched with e2, that would leave e1 worse off than if it stayed under µ1. So in the face of
this uncertainty, the essential question is: would e1 leave this marketplace? Without knowledge of the second order
effects of its decision to leave, e1 must make a complex decision. As mechanism designers, this presents an interesting
challenge and one which we will explore with several notions of stability in this section.
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Greedy Stability
Under the scenario where e1 is currently matched under µ1, they may choose to leave the marketplace to be matched
with a2 solely because a match with a2 may produce a better outcome from them. Formally, this can be defined by
saying that e1 would deviate if there exists some match with a consenting applicant which could improve their outcome,
regardless of whether that match is the final result. We put this formally with a definition of a greedy blocking pair.
Definition 2. A match µ has a greedy blocking pair (a, e) if e a µ(a) and there exists γ ∈ Ere such that (a, γ) e
(µ(e), µ(Re)).
Equivalently, a match µ has a greedy blocking pair (a, e) if there exists a match µ′ such that the following hold: (1)
µ′(a) = e, (2) e a µ(a), and (3) (a, µ′(Re)) e (µ(e), µ(Re)).
We can then define stability as the absence of a greedy blocking pair.
Definition 3. A matching µ is greedily stable if there does not exists a greedy blocking pair (a, e).
There are two interesting properties of this definition of stability: it reduces to the stable marriage problem under
consistent preferences, but it may have no stable match if the preferences are allowed to be inconsistent.
Greedy Stability and Consistent Preferences
It is easy to see that if every employer’s preferences are consistent, then we can treat the problem as a stable marriage.
Proposition 1. Consider an affiliate matching marketplace where each employer is affiliate-agnostic, i.e. has ex-
pressed consistent preferences. The imposition of greedy stability onto this marketplace reduces the problem to stable
marriage, and all results therefrom can be concluded.
Proof. By the definition of consistent preferences for the employer, the first element of every tuple in e follows an
order (that of ). This means that under the definition of greedy blocking pair, we will have (a, e) as a blocking pair
of match µ only if aµ(e). Therefore, we can reduce the problem to that of stable marriage where the employers
preferences are expressed as  and the applicant’s preferences are expressed as ≺a.
However, without consistency of the preferences, there may not be a stable match, i.e., the core may be empty.
Empty Core
The affiliate matching problem with greedy stability may have an empty core, as seen in Example 3.
Example 3. Consider the matching marketplace depicted in Figure 1 of three employers and three employer where
each employer has only one affiliate (signified in the grey connections). We observe that each employer does not admit
consistent preferences. In this setting, every match has a greedy blocking pair. The matching µ1 is blocked by greedy
blocking pair (a1, e2) which prefers µ4. The matching µ2 is blocked by greedy blocking pair (a1, e2) which prefers µ4.
The matching µ3 is blocked by greedy blocking pair (a1, e3) which prefers µ6. The matching µ4 is blocked by greedy
blocking pair (a1, e3) which prefers µ6. The matching µ5 is blocked by greedy blocking pair (a3, e3) which prefers
µ1. The matching µ6 is blocked by greedy blocking pair (a2, e1) which prefers µ5.
Integer-Program-based Approaches to Clearing Affiliate Matching Markets
General clearing approaches that can take one of many objective functions, or one of many sets of constraints (such
as one or more notions of stability) are necessary when exploring the fielding of a new matching market. Thus, it is
natural to look at integer programs, particularly with an eye towards real world implementation of this model where
we may wish to maximize socially desirable outcomes, like number of agents with their top choice, some notion of
fairness or equity, or other linearly expressed optimization objectives.
We proceed by giving an integer program of greedy stable affiliate matching. Let Z be a binary matrix with zij as
an indicator variable of whether ai is matched to ej .
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To enforce the definition of a match, we require that every agent is matched with at most one other agent.∑
i
zij ≤ 1 ∀j (1)∑
j
zij ≤ 1 ∀i (2)
To ensure the match is stable, we need to require that for all pairs (i, j), the tuple (ai, ej) is not a blocking pair.
So either, the pair is matched, i.e. µ(ai) = ej which happens if and only if zij = 1, or they are not matched. If they
are not matched, then there are two options: (1) ai is matched to someone they prefer over ej , or (2) there exists some
applicant who ej “prefers more”2 given the current matchings of ej’s affiliates.
The second condition warrants some extra care. The condition for the employers in the definition of a blocking
pair states: there exists γ ∈ Ere such that (a, γ) e (µ(e), µ(Re)). Its logical negation is: (a, γ) ≺e (µ(e), µ(Re))
for all γ ∈ Ere . As we are forming the linear program constraints, for a given Z, we can map the affiliates of e and
denote Z(Re). We note that Z(Re) ∈ Ere and is fixed for a given Z. Therefore, to test if e breaks the blocking pair
condition, we look for those a′ such that (a, γ) ≺e (a′, Z(Re)) for all γ. We now state the stability condition of the
integer program: for all (i, j),
zij +
∑
`:ej≺aie`
z`j +
∑
`:∀γ,(ai,γ)≺ej (a`,Z(Rej ))
zi` ≥ 1. (3)
Strict Stability
Intuitively, an employer may only wish to deviate from a match if they can find other agents among whom they all
match and strictly improve their outcome with respect to their full preference profile . Recall that the problem with
a2 and e1 leaving the match of µ1 is that e1 could either end up in a better position or a worse position, depending on
what happens to its affiliates.
In the following discussion, we introduce strict stability, which says that an employer wouldn’t deviate from a
match unless it is sure it would improve its outcome. In the running example of (a2, e1), this means that e1 wouldn’t
deviate from their match unless the final match of the entire system were µ5.
Definition 4. A match µ has a strict blocking coalition (CA, CE) if there exists a match µ′ where the following hold:
1. CA ⊂ A, CE ⊂ E;
2. for all e ∈ CE , it is true that Re ⊂ CA, µ′(e) ∈ CA, and (µ′(e), µ′(Re)) e (µ(e), µ(Re)); and
3. for all a ∈ CA, it is true that µ′(a) a µ(a) and µ′(a) ∈ CE .
A direct result of this definition is that this coalition entirely matches with itself, and more importantly every
affiliate of every employer is matched to another one of the employers in the coalition.
Returning to our example of in Figure 1 where the system is currently matched under µ1. Recall that e1 would like
to consider coalition with a2 in order to improve its outcome. However, in order to form a strict blocking coalition, the
coalition would at least have to comprise of a1, a2, and e1, e2. One can check that µ5 is preferred to µ1 by all elements
of this coalition, thus they have formed a strict blocking coalition. Note, that by doing so, a3’s new outcome would
move from their first choice to their last, and e3 would also wind up with their last choice.
We now state the obvious definition of strictly stable and show that Figure 1 is stable.
Definition 5. A match µ is strictly stable if any coalition (CA, CE) is not a strictly blocking coalition.
Example 4. The marketplace in Figure 1 has a strictly stable match: µ1. This match is unique because it is comprised
of three coalitions already (ai, ei) for i = 1, 2, 3. The only other coalitions to consider are as follows. The coalition
({a1, a2}, {e1, e2}) is not blocking because e1 does not prefer µ3 to µ1. The coalition ({a1, a3}, {e1, e3}) is not
blocking because a3 does not prefer µ6 to µ1. The coalition ({a2, a3}, {e2, e3}) is not blocking because e3 does not
prefer µ2 to µ1.
2This is in quotes because the preference language is not exclusively over agents.
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5 Designing Affiliate Matching Mechanisms: Desiderata and Challenges
In this final section, we outline multi-disciplinary research challenges that should be addressed first as this topic
develops. We believe that without a community discussion and consensus on the following topics, then there may not
be a clear answer as to the form of mechanism to deploy for the affiliate matching problem—if such a mechanism is
appropriate to deploy at all. These challenges are loosely coupled, but exist with distinct motivations and implications.
We conclude with a discussion of some additional ethical considerations that place affiliate matching in the context of
economic mechanisms.
Research Challenge 1. Does an affiliate matching mechanism reify notions of prestige in a way that produces harm?
The importance and impact of prestige has been well-documented in the literature on labor markets [e.g., Caplow
and McGee, 1958, Crane, 1965, Long et al., 1979, Burris, 2004, Way et al., 2016, Sauder et al., 2012, Clauset et al.,
2015]. Those individuals who are able to obtain positions at prestigious employers have access to distinctive resources
which increase their ability to yield more desirable outcomes in their careers. These impacts often perpetuate them-
selves and become ingrained into unchangeable systems which operate to advance the interests of those at the top of a
stratified system.
Under Bourdieu [1986]’s conception of social and economic capital, the model which we created above could
be used to enrich those who currently have some social capital with more forms of economic and social capital.
Depending on your view, this is an inevitable outcome of humans and network effects, or this is a phenomenon which
we can try to work against in the design of some matching mechanisms. Without a clear and thoughtful consensus on
the appropriate goal of a central mechanism in this problem, any further work in this space could be pointless.
Research Challenge 2. How do current affiliate marketplaces operate?
In order to understand truly if an affiliate matching mechanism is appropriate, there must be a thorough study of
current marketplaces. We must first understand how the affiliate marketplaces function and what their inefficiencies
are. Scholarship in this research challenge will bring about clarity with respect to how to properly incorporate any
proposed, appropriate matching mechanism.
Work, like that cited in Research Challenge 1 include some answers to these questions. Furthering scholarship [see,
e.g., Wang and Boutilier, 2003, Boutilier et al., 2006, Domshlak et al., 2011, Vayanos et al., 2020] can investigate how
preference elicitation can be efficiently performed for the complex decision space of employers across A × Ere . We
also found evidence of strategic behavior on the part of employers in our survey (e.g., from Respondent #6, “I will settle
for my second choice so he can go to the top tiered school. Worth it I think.”) Indeed, progress here should motivate
extensions to models traditional concerns for the computational social choice community—specifically, preference
elicitation and aggregation, and incentive properties [e.g., Dietrich and List, 2007, Baumeister et al., 2013, Brandt
et al., 2016].
Research Challenge 3. How much do employers care about their affiliates? How much should they care?
Respondents in our survey had differential perspectives on if it was appropriate to care about the match of their
affiliates. Respondent #133 indicated, “If it cannot be fair, it must be the least unfair. The most unfair would be
to downgrade the the top two and advantage the lowest.” While Respondent #29 said “Even if Ryan isn’t the top
candidate, he should be given the chance at the top school.” Understanding and balancing these divergent views will be
crucial to implementation and adoption of any designed central clearinghouse. In-depth study should involve domain
experts in labor markets.
Research Challenge 4. What is the right definition of stability?
As we saw in Section 4, differences in the definition of stability can lead to different “acceptable” outcomes. As is
true in all designing of matching mechanisms, stability is used as way to enforce participation in a marketplace. The
logic is that deviation from a mechanism’s stable outcome would be weakly worse for a participant. These marketplaces
operate under the implicit social contract between agents that adherence to the mechanism’s output will be mutually
beneficial in terms of overall harm reduction.
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It is our hope that by studying and understanding these research challenges more, a community of scholars can form
around this affiliate matching problem and can engage with stakeholders in potential labor markets to determine the
appropriateness of a matching mechanism.
Ethical Impact of our Work
In addition to the ethical questions that are brought about by the above research challenges, we see other important
discussion points. Making socially- and morally-laden decisions are necessary steps when designing economic mecha-
nisms; indeed, the allocation of scarce resources, or matching agents to other agents or opportunities, often comes with
unavoidable creation of winners and losers. One way to enforce socially desirable outcomes in a matching mechanism
is by careful definition and analysis of desiderata, such as stability, of a mechanism. Stability in particular yields one
form of fairness—it eliminates justifiable envy—which we as mechanism designers can define in a way to produce
outcomes that align with social and moral values of a society.
Additionally, the way that prestige operates in affiliate marketplaces could potentially be viewed as deleterious—
enriching those who are already privileged at the expense of those with fewer means and resources. At issue will be
whether a course of study in affiliate matching is about understanding the current practices for the sake of understand-
ing, or if the ultimate goal is reform. If it is the latter, any reform has unintended consequences which could ultimately
cause more harm than any intended benefit. We hope that this work serves to contribute in a positive direction towards
understanding a current system and its inequities, but we also acknowledge that it might ultimately serve to solidify
some of these very ideas.
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A Survey Protocol
Faculty Hiring Program
The design of this survey is aimed at understanding how you make decisions with different competing priorities.
You will be exploring this concept in the setting of a hiring market for new faculty professors. The Survey will have
two parts: (1) familiarization with faculty hiring, and (2) answering questions about your preferences. We begin with
the familiarization part now.
Consider a hiring market such as this one with three applicants (Ryan, Alex, and Taylor), and three universities
(Bear Mountain, Littlewood, and West Shores).
Imagine that you are Bear Mountain University, and you performed an evaluation of the applicants. You decided
that you liked Alex more than you liked Taylor, and you liked Taylor more than you liked Ryan.
Top Tier Candidates Middle Tier Candidates Bottom Tier Candidates
Alex Taylor Ryan
You could depict that preference as:
First Choice
Second Choice
Third Choice
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To test your comprehension of the previous setting, can you now do the matchings yourself? These are intuitive
and should be easy to complete.
Assume you are Bear Mountain University. Assume this time that after you review the applicants, you place
them in these tiers:
Top Tier Candidates Middle Tier Candidates Bottom Tier Candidates
Ryan Alex Taylor
Then what is your ranking of the following options?
Assuming you believe the above, rank these outcomes from your most preferred (1) to your least preferred (3).
Assume you are Bear Mountain University. Assume this time that after you review the applicants, you place
them in these tiers:
Top Tier Candidates Middle Tier Candidates Bottom Tier Candidates
Alex Taylor Ryan
Then what is your ranking of the following options?
Assuming you believe the above, rank these outcomes from your most preferred (1) to your least preferred (3).
Assume you are Bear Mountain University. Assume this time that after you review the applicants, you place
them in these tiers:
Top Tier Candidates Middle Tier Candidates Bottom Tier Candidates
Taylor Alex Ran
Then what is your ranking of the following options?
Assuming you believe the above, rank these outcomes from your most preferred (1) to your least preferred (3).
Awesome! Now onto the second part of the Survey. Since you understand the basic faculty hiring setting, let us
introduce another layer of complexity.
In faculty hiring, the applicants are affiliated with a university based off where they earned their PhD. What this
means is that universities also care about where their student gets a job.
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Assume that you are Bear Mountain University and your student is Ryan. You then have the following five
options of matchings:
You are matched with Ryan.
You are matched with Alex; Ryan is matched with Littlewood University.
You are matched with Taylor; Ryan is matched with Littlewood University.
You are matched with Alex; Ryan is matched with West Shores University.
You are matched with Taylor; Ryan is matched with West Shores University.
In the remainder of the survey, we will ask you to express your preferences over these five options under different
settings of which applicants you like best and what you think of the different universities.
For the remainder of the survey, you will get to decide how you would like to balance your own interest in being
matched with the best candidates possible, and where Ryan should be matched. There is no right answer – it is up to
you about how you balance these two things.
Randomly assigned either of the two following prompts:
For the remainder of the survey, you will get to decide how you would like to balance your own interest in being
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matched with the best candidates possible, and where Ryan should be matched. There is no right answer – it is up to
you about how you balance these two things.
or
In faculty hiring, it is common to want your student to be placed at the best university possible. This is often
because you as a university will be perceived as a better university if your students get jobs at top tier schools.
So, keep in mind that if Ryan is placed at a higher ranked university, then your university will be viewed better and
could hire better candidates in the future. While you want Ryan to be matched with the best school, you must balance
this priority with your competing priority that you want the best candidate possible. There is no right answer – it is up
to you about how you balance these two things.
We will ask you to express your preferences to 8 scenarios. When you are ready, please continue to Part 2.
Display this question 8 times with the ordering in the tables randomized without replacement.
Assume that you are Bear Mountain University and Ryan is your student.
Assume that you have evaluated the candidates and you decided to place the applicants in the following tiers. You
think that Alex is the best candidate for your job, then Taylor is second best, and Ryan is least qualified.
Top Tier Candidates Middle Tier Candidates Bottom Tier Candidates
Alex Taylor Ryan (your student)
Assume that you have the following beliefs about the schools, based off of the school’s ranking. You think that Lit-
tlewood (LU) is the best school, then you think your school (BMU) is in the middle tier of schools, and West Shores
(WSU) is in the bottom tier.
Top Tier Schools Middle Tier Schools Bottom Tier Schools
LU BMU (your school) WSU
Assuming you believe the above, rank these outcomes from your most preferred (1) to your least preferred (5).
Can you describe the procedure you used to rank these? Why did you use this procedure?
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